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NATURALISTIC AND CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A
MORE EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW"
F. S. C. NORTHROPt
INTERNATIONAL like domestic law must face the difficult question of
norms. Without common norms between the nations and the cultures of
the world there can be no effective international law. How are such uni-
versal norms for an effective international law to be found?
Contemporary developments in the social sciences and in the philosophy
of natural science indicate that there are two sources. One is in the norms
common to the diverse cultures of the world. The other is in scientifically
verified philosophy of nature. The former source happens to be intimately
connected with the latter.
It has been suggested elsewhere' that the philosophy of nature as given
content by the epistemologically analyzed, empirically verified theory of
natural science can be used as a criterion of those ethical and legal norms
which are universal and hence of the character required to undergird a more
effective international law. It is the purpose of this paper ( 1 ) to show that
this is the method of ethical and legal science of the traditional Orient and
of the classical West up to at least the time of Kant; (2) to specify in
greater detail what the method requires and how it proceeds; and (3) to
point out that a new contemporary positive international law rooted in
such empirically verified, universally valid norms has a chance of being ef-
fective since it meets the crucial criterion of effective law of the great soci-
ologist of law, Ehrlich.
By an empirically verified science and philosophy of nature we shall mean
one whose basic assumptions are confirmed either (a) directly or (b) in-
directly through their deductive consequences, by appeal to data given
with immediacy. This inclusion of directly verified theory permits us, as
the sequel will show, to regard Oriental philosophy as empirically verified
scientific knowledge, even though it differs from the experimentally con-
firmed, deductively formulated type of science and philosophy that arose
with, and has grown in vitality since the time of the Ancient Greeks in the
* The author is indebted to the Viking Fund for a grant which makes possible this
and other research in this field. The YALE LAW JOURNAL is indebted to Ruth Nanda
Anshen, the Editor, and to Harper & Bros., the publishers, of the forthcoming volume on
ethics, in the SCIENCE OF CULTURE SERIES, from which portions of this article are taken.
t Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law, Yale Law School.
1. F. S. C. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST (hereafter referred to as
MEW) cc. VIII, XII, XIII (1946); NORTHROP, LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND TIE Hu-
MANITIES (hereafter referred to as LSH) c. XXII and especially pp. 359-60 (1947) ; Juris-
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West, and which, as Albert Einstein and others have shown,2 is only in-
directly verified.
Verification of a scientific theory is indirect if its basic assumptions refer
to entities such as electrons which cannot be directly observed and if conse-
quently the theory can be tested empirically only indirectly by way of theo-
rems which are deduced from its basic assumptions. Then the logic of
verification takes on the following form of the hypothetical syllogism: If A
(the unobservable postulated scientific objects) then B (the deduced theo-
rem or theorems). B is the case. Therefore A is the case.
As is well known, such an argument of the hypothetical syllogism com-
mits the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent. What follows is not
that a theory verified in this manner is false and should be rejected--quite
the contrary, since the argument tells us that the implication of the theory
has been confirmed. What follows instead is merely the warning that the
uniqueness of the theory has not been established. In other words, from
the fact that A implies B which is directly verified to be the case, it does not
follow that A is the only theory from which can be deduced the directly and
experimentally verified fact described by B. Hence, while indirect verifica-
tion confirms what one would expect if the theory in question is true and
hence warrants our retaining the theory, the presence of the fallacy of
affirming the consequent involved in such a logic of verification tells us also
that the theory must be held tentatively with the mind open to other theo-
retical possibilities and with a willingness to reject the theory the moment
any empirical fact turns up which is contrary to any of its deduced theo-
rems.
Verification of a theory is direct when its basic assumptions refer only to
entities and relations which are immediately apprehensible, thereby permit-
ting its postulates themselves rather than merely some of its deduced theo-
rems to be empirically tested. Curiously enough, it is Oriental rather than
Western science and philosophy which meets this more certain and strin-
gent test for empirical verification. Thus there is a sense in which Oriental
philosophy is not merely as scientific as, but even more scientific than that
of the West. Certainly, no science or philosophy can be more scientific
than one which insists upon direct verification of its basic assumptions.
The Ethical and Legal Method of the Orient
The most widely accepted system of Hindu philosophy is Vedanta. The
fundamental concept in this philosophy is Brahman. Of Brahman, two
things are asserted: (1) Brahman, which is the cosmical principle in na-
ture, is identical with A.tman, which is the psychical principle in the self.
2. See my paper, Einstebs Conception of Science, in ALBERT EINSTEIN: PHuLOSO-
PHER-SCIENTIST, 7 THE LIBRARY OF LrvING PHILOSOPHERS (Schilpp ed. 1949); also
NORTHROP, LSH, op. cit. supra note 1, c. XII; and HENRY AGnENAU, THE NATURE OF
PHYSICALREAL TY (1950).
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(2) Brahman is known by immediate apprehension. The first of these two
assertions assures us that Brahman refers to nature and hence is a concept
in the philosophy of nature. The second assertion guarantees that Bralh-
man is verified directly and denotatively by immediate apprehension.
In all Buddhist philosophical systems, the major concept is Nirvana or
Suchness or the Void. Again we are told that this important factor in
knowledge embraces nature as well as man and is known only with imme-
diacy. Hence its verification is direct. In fact Nirvana and Brahman
alike embrace not merely nature and man as an object of knowledge in na-
ture but also man as the determinate particular subjective knower of nature.
In China the three major philosophies of indigenous origin are Taoism,
Confucianism and Chan or Zen Buddhism. Although Buddhism arose in
India, Chan or Zen Buddhism, as Professor D. T. Suzuki has emphasized,
is a creation of the Chinese. That Chan Buddhism is equally naturalistic
is shown by the setting of its monasteries in the mountains, the communion
with nature of its practitioners, and its naturalistic intermixture with Tao-
ism in Chinese landscape painting.3 Only in the case of Confucianism
might it seem that Chinese philosophy is an exception to the traditional
rule that ethical and legal norms are to find their verification in nature.
This exception is, however, a mere seeming. If the Confucian sages are
asked why their particular norms for social and personal behavior are the
true ones, the answer is that these norms put man in harmony with nature.4
This recursive reference of Confucian personal and legal ethical norms
to one's directly verified knowledge of nature has been obscured by many
students of Confucian ethics because they have neglected to reconstruct the
very technical conception of nature referring to the directly sensed colors
of the different seasons of the yearly cycle of nature and to the natural dif-
ferences between types of men. The latter differences, like sensed se-
quences of colors designating spring, summer, fall and winter, are regarded
as characteristics of groups of individuals which are quite independent of
cultural beliefs or of culturally conditioned and relative norms, much after
the manner of the different natural personality types and their role with
respect to ethics, in the studies of Charles W. Morris in our own time.
Good personal and social conduct, according to the Confucian Chinese,
is that behavior of individuals and that ordering of social relations which
takes into account these directly sensed sequences of the seasons and the
empirically evident natural diversities of human nature. As the Neo-Con-
fucianist Hu Yan Mung, quoting from the Confucianist Siun Tseu, said
of a specific ethical and legal social norm, "This rule is called 'equality con-
3. See Plates XIII and XIV in NORTHROP, MEW, supra note 1, at 406.
4. For evidence supporting this point and a designation of its precise content and
meaning, see Gray L. Dorsey's investigation of the source of verification of Confucian
Chinese legal norms in his chapter, Two Objective Bases for a World-Wide Legal Order,
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER (F. S. C. Northrop ed. 1949).
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formable to "natural" differentiation' or 'union without injury to "human'
diversity.""-
The connection between the ethical and legal ordering of people in society
and empirically grounded conceptions of nature in Confucian Chinese cul-
ture is even more explicit. Granet has shown that when the early Chinese
shifted from a two-fold conception of natural phenomena expressed in terms
of yin yang to a four-fold conception of nature based on the four-sensed
directions projecting out from the perceiver their rules for the proper
ethical ordering of people in man-directed society underwent a correspond-
ing change.'
This naturalistic criterion for the validity of ethical norms in traditional
Oriental philosophy and culture shows even more markedly when we look
at the practical behavior which these norms prescribe. The Chinese paint-
ing which gives the greatest expression to Buddhist and Taoist religious
and other human values is the naturalistic landscape painting. In this
painting man is usually portrayed as either a relatively insignificant item
in one corner of the picture or a sage sitting under a tree immediately ap-
prehending the all-embracing immediacy of nature within which he is im-
mersed. It is a commonplace that the Hindu of the morally highest caste,
after establishing his family and training his son to succeed him, is re-
quired, as an ethical prescription by the norms of his philosophical and re-
ligious beliefs, to withdraw from cultural institutions and conventional fam-
ily and social relations and return to the pristine relation to nature of a
forest hermit and an itinerant seer, making a pilgrimage to the naturalistic
freshness of the Himalayas. Even the Confucianist Chinese painter suc-
ceeds in conveying the values of his art only, he tells us, by becoming the
naturalistic object which is bamboo.
For all these Orientals-Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian-alike,
humanistic and cultural values are good to the extent that they conform to
nature and the naturalistic differences of men. Furthermore, man prevents
even these cultural norms from becoming dead, mechanical rules devoid of
the spirit which sustains them only by immediate apprehension of, com-
munion with, and return to the all-embracing immediacy of nature which
is their source. It is not an accident in the philosophical tradition of India
that one of the earliest bodies of written treatises, upon which the later
Upanishads and the even later philosophical systems are largely commen-
taries, are called .Aranyakas or forest treatises. Only by returning from
the man-made normative ethical and legal conventions of cultural and so-
cial organization to the non-man-made pristine freshness and absoluteness
of the primeval forests and nature can man find the source in which the
ethical norms and institutions find their objective validation and from
which they derive their spiritual vitality.
5. Id. at 451.
6. MARCEL GRgAET, LA PENSEE CHINOISE (1934).
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The Rig-Veda is the oldest book of Aryan civilization, East or West.
Professor N. G. D. Joardar, in his lectures in the Yale Law School on the
nature and background of the traditional law of India, has pointed out that
there are in this Rig-Veda twenty seers or sages who describe the nature
of legal rules or norms and the source of their validation. The basic com-
mon thesis is that law, called rita, has its basis in, derives from, and in fact
is the source of the cosmic order of nature. To be sure, for some of them
this law is prior to the natural cosmic order. Even so, the law which
is the true rule for men to use in ordering their man-made cultural institu-
tions is derived from the order of non-man-made cosmic nature.
These early seers of the Rig-Veda go even further, distinguishing the
normative law for society, called vrata, from natural law called rita, and
adding that vrata has its source and validation in rita. In fact, it is from
rita that vrata or dharma, that later Sanskrit word for law, derives. In his
treatise on the Ancient and Medieval Religious and Civil Law of India,
Pandurang Vaman Kane writes: "The idea of Dharma took the place of
the very ancient conception of rta. In the Rgveda rta denotes the supreme
transcendental law or the cosmic order by which the universe and even the
gods are governed. . . ." He then quotes with approval Berolzheimer's
statement8 that vrata and dharma are "derivatives" from rita.
The ancient seers of India made another distinction between vrata or
dharma and smrtis or samaya. The smrtis express the positive law and
commentaries of tradition; samaya refers to the more recent usage or con-
ventions. Thus the smrtis and samaya refer to the positive and living law
of society as it is in fact. For this reason, while suggestive with respect to
legal norms, they cannot be taken as authoritative; in fact, they may be evil
because, being man-made, they may derive from a conception of nature and
natural man which is false. Thus P. V. Kane writes: "The smrtis are com-
posed by human authors and so have no independent authority in matters
of dharma, as a man may say what is either false or mistaken."' D Vrata, on
the other hand, because it derives from rta which is verified against non-
man-made nature, provides an ethical and legal "ought" against which the
cultural "is" of sociological jurisprudence as described by smrtis and sa-
maya can be judged. In short sociological jurisprudence, restricted as it
is to the cultural "is," gives trustworthy norms only to the extent that it
embodies a true or verified conception of nature and natural man.
The same naturalistic criterion for personal and legal norms appears
after the Rig-Veda in the most important of all legal books in India, the
book of Manu. Its conception and specification of personal domestic and
legal norms still operate all over India. Although probably edited in its
7. IANE, 3 HISTORY OF DHARMASASTRA 244-45 (1946).
8. BEROLZHEimER, THE WORLD'S LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 37-8 (Jastrow's transl,
1912).
9. IANE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 829.
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present form in the period between the second century B.C. and the second
century A.D., it is continuous with the earlier tradition of the Rig-Veda.
It does not surprise us, therefore, that the legal tradition of Manu begins
with cosmology and the philosophy of nature and then refers all norms to
this naturalistic source for their validation.' 0
The Ethical and Legal fethod of the Classical Wfrest
It is well known that the technical terminology used even today in every
law school in the Western world was created when Western law was made
a science by those Roman jurists of whom the Scaevolas were the leaders.
A. Vernon Arnold in his classic treatise, Roman Stoicism, has made it clear
that most of the Romans who created Western legal science were Stoic
philosophers. It is a commonplace of Stoic philosophy that the good is de-
fined as conformity to the philosophy of the true for nature.
It is another commonplace of this scientifically formulated Roman law
with its abstract technical legal concepts, that the legal norms which it
regarded as valid for all men were called the jus gent hin. At the begin-
ning of his Irstitutes, Gaius writes as follows: "Every human community
that is regulated by laws and customs observes a rule of conduct which in
part is peculiar to itself, and in part is common to mankind in general. The
rule of conduct which a people has settled for its own observance, and which
is peculiar to that people, is termed the jus civile. Those principles which
natural reason has taught to all mankind, are equally observed by all, and
collectively are termed the jus gentium."'
It is to be noted that the criterion for distinguishing the local provincial
legal rules of the jus civile, from the universal legal norms valid for all men
of the jus gentium, is "natural reason." Moreover, natural reason was not
regarded as a priori. As will be shown in the sequel, it was defined by sci-
entific methods which proceed from directly given data to deductively for-
mulated scientific theory. In other words, it is reason applied to the facts
of nature, which provides the criterion for universally valid ethical and le-
gal norms.
The point in part is that, whereas men live in different cultures which
generate the relative and often conflicting ethical and legal norms of the
differing instances of jus civile, all men in the different cultures nonetheless
live in the same nature. Consequently, whereas the derivation of ethics
from a philosophy grounded in the humanities of the differing cultures will
lead to the pluralism and relativity of ethical and legal norms of the jus
civile, an ethics derived from a philosophy based on nature alone gives the
ethical and legal norms universally valid for all men of the naturalistic jus
gentium.
10. THE LAws OF AIAmu, 49 SACRED Booxs OF THE EAST CC. I, II (F. Max Miller
ed. 1886).
11. N sMrriT, OUTLINE OF Rom"' HISTORY 200, § 1 (1890).
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It is to be emphasized that the distinction between jis civile and jfs gen-
tium, while necessary, is not a sufficient criterion of the universally norma-
tive. There is more than one jus gentiumn. It is only the naturalistic igs
gentium which gives ethical and legal codes that are universally valid. As
Arthur Nussbaum has pointed out in his Concise History of the Law of
Nations," there are two different meanings of the fits gentium in Roman
legal science. The one we shall call the philosophy of culture or sociological
jus gentium, the other the philosophy of nature or naturalistic jus gentihm.
The sociological jus gentium of the Romans is determined by studying the
de facto legal rules and conventions of diverse societies and abstracting
from them those legal rules and conventions which all the de facto societies
have in common. By this standard slavery would be a normative good in
society since every society known in Roman times contained slaves. There
was, however, for Roman law another jus gentium derived not from that
which is universal in the sociological "is" of different societies and cultures,
but from the empirically verified science and philosophy of nature. It is
only by the latter naturalistically grounded philosophical basis for ethical
and legal norms that the Romans arrived at the theory that slavery, al-
though universally present originally in every de facto society, is nonethe-
less evil. If status in nature rather than in the universal sociological "is"
common to all de facto societies defines the good for men, then, since a
slave is as genuine a creature of nature as is the head of an aristocratic
family, status under the law must center in being a citizen of nature rather
than a citizen of a proper aristocratic family and justice under such a law
becomes the same for the slave as for the paterfamilias.
To be sure, this rule in ancient Roman times was followed more in
principle than in fact, as is the case even today in the Dixiecratic portion
of the United States. Nonetheless, even then, the norm against slavery was
established as a principle, never again to lose its force as a norm in the
Western world. Furthermore, an examination of the "Institutes" of Gaius
will show that its codes make use of this naturalistic concept of legal status
and citizenship to bring many people who were previously slaves under the
protection of the law and into the legal status of free men in the Roman
families.
These experiences of the Romans are illuminating with respect to certain
contemporary suggestions for determining universally valid ethical and
legal norms. Recent investigations by cultural anthropologists and soci-
ologists have revealed the relativity and diversity of ethical and legal norms
in the different nations and cultures of the contemporary world. The
ideological conflict between the Soviet Russians and the traditional West-
ern democracies underlines this fact. One suggestion offered by many
contemporary social scientists for finding the universal common ethical and
12. NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 19 (1947).
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legal norms necessary to build an effective resolution of the international
disputes by legal rather than by warful means is to seek out the common
factors in the diverse national and cultural legal codes and social norms.
Such an investigation would give us the kind of universal norms the Ro-
mans had in their sociological jus gcntium.
Such a sociological jus gcntium has two weaknesses, however, as a cri-
terion of universal ethical and legal principles. The first weakness is that
the common factor in the diverse norms of different nations and cultures
is too weak to provide an effective norm for settling disputes. For ex-
ample, the issue between Russian Communists and American New or Fair
Dealers, which threatens the peace of the contemporary world, turns around -
the economic, political and other rules for human relations in society with
respect to which the Americans and Russians differ, not around the norms
which they have in common. The second weakness in the universal com-
mon norms of sociological jurisprudence is that the de facto legal norm
common to all societies and cultures, even were it not weak, is not neces-
sarily good. The universality of slavery in every legal system at the time
of the Romans is a case in point.
The latter consideration indicates that an adequate ethical and legal
science must have a jus gentiuzn with its foundations outside the de facto
ethical conventions and codes of the humanistic sociological fis gentiun;
otherwise there is no basis under any circumstances for judging the status
quo sociological "is" to be bad. The only source for norms other than
those of the sociological "is" of culture is nature. It was precisely for this
reason that the Roman Stoic philosophers who created the Western science
of law distinguished the sociological jus gentium from the philosophical
naturalistic jus gentium and affirmed that only the latter jus gentium is the
criterion of the good and the just. Hence, the well-known dictum of Ro-
man legal science that jus gentium is grounded in jus vaturae.
It appears, therefore, that the ethical and legal methods of the traditional
Orient and the classical West are identical. Just as the Vedic and Upanish-
adic law, which forms the customs of India to the present moment through
the persisting influence of the codes of Manu, distinguishes the sociological
"is" of de facto custom, called samaya, from the normative "ought" of
vrata and declares that vrata, which designates the normatively good and
just derives from rita, the law of nature; so the Roman foundations of
Western legal science distinguish the fis civile of local, relativistic de facto
positive legal codes and customs from the jus gentium, and within the fits
gentium distinguish the sociological jus gentium of those codes common
to all de facto societies from the naturalistic philosophical jus gentium
which alone specifies the criterion of the universally good and just because
it is grounded in jus naturae.
In the classical West, it was not merely the Roman Stoic philosophers,
who were the creators of the Western science of law, who used this method.
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A. Vernon Arnold has made it unequivocally clear that every school of
Greek philosophy-Zenoian Stoics, Platonists, Aristotelians and Epicure-
ans-used the same method.'
Of Zeno, the founder of the Greek Stoic School, Arnold writes: "The
ideal state must embrace the whole world, so that a man no longer says,
'I am of Athens' or 'of Sideon,' but 'I am a citizen of the world.' Its laws
must be those which are prescribed by nature, not by convention. ' 14 Ar-
nold continues, "Zeno, after writing his Republic, . . . could not, perhaps,
avoid noticing that the coming of his model Kingdom was hindered by the
narrowmindedness of the philosophers, their disagreement with one an-
- other, and their lack of clear proofs for their dogmas. He began to realize
that the study of dialectics and physics was of more importance than his
Cynic teachers would allow; . . . From this time he no longer restricted
his outlook to force of character, but sought also for argumentative power
and well ascertained knowledge. The foundations of his state must be
surely laid, not upon the changing tide of opinion, but on the rock of
knowledge.""
Platonists, Aristotelians and Epicureans used the same method. "It
was," continues Arnold, "a common complaint of [the Aristotelians] that
the Stoics had stolen their doctrines wholesale and had altered their names
only."' 6 Of the Epicureans and Stoics, Arnold adds: "Both founded, or
conceived that they founded their ethical doctrine upon physical proofs;
that is, both maintained that the end of life which they put forward was
that prescribed by natural law. As a consequence, they agreed in remov-
ing the barrier which Socrates had set up against the pursuit of natural
science."'"
Apparently Socrates reached the same conclusion before he died. Other-
wise it is difficult to believe that Plato in Book VII of the Republic would
have put the following words into the mouth of his beloved Socrates: "But
I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this,
[the idea of the good] and only to one who is a disciple of the previous
sciences."'" If one turns back a few pages in the Republic, where the de-
scription of these previous sciences appears, one will discover that everyone
of them is a mathematical natural science. This means that the later Soc-
rates, if Plato's description of him can be trusted, believed that the ethical
norms for human conduct and legal institutions must be verified against
the experimentally verified theories of mathematical natural science when
the latter theories are analyzed by the method of dialectic to bring out their
13. ARNOLD, ROMAN STOICISM (1911).
14. Id. at 66.
15. Id. at 67.
16. Id. at 64.
17. Id. at 74.
18. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, Bk. 7, line 534, p. 236 (B. Jowett ed. 1888).
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epistemological assumptions and the attendant theory of natural man as a
mind or knower which they entail.
Nor is it difficult to find the reason why Socrates changed his mind about
the method of ethics in the later portion of his life. As A. Vernon Arnold
has made clear, the attempt of the early Socrates to ignore the philosophy
of nature and set up ethics as an independent subject, appealing to the facts
of intuitively given conduct and of the intuitively given humanistic values
of culture for its validation, led to the ethical relativism of the Sophists and
the cultural relativism of the jfs civilc. It led also to the skepticism about
the possibility of validating ethical norms that produced the Cynics. In
short, Socrates, in the early portion of his life, tried out the non-naturalistic
method for validating ethical norms, pursued by some modern philosophers
since the time of Kant, and found it to end in failure.
The later Socrates, and all subsequent schools of Greek philosophy-the
Zenoian Stoics, the Platonists, the Aristotelians and the Epicureans-
brought physics and the philosophy of natural science back into ethics as
basic. Forthwith for all schools of Greek and Roman philosophy, ethics is
the philosophy of natural science applied. As H. Rackham writes in his
"Introduction" to Cicero's De Natura Deorunz, "In spite of the strong
antagonism between the Epicureans and the Stoics, their doctrines had
features in common which indeed characterized all the thought of the pe-
riod. From Aristotle onward Greek philosophy became systematic; it fell
into three recognized departments, Logic, Physics, and Ethics, answering
the three fundamental questions of the human mind: (1) How do I know
the world? (2) What is the nature of the world? (3) The world being
what it is, how am I to live in it so as to secure happiness ?1o
The character of logic as conceived by all these schools of Greek philoso-
phy, which came to expression in Roman Stoicism, is described in detail
by Arnold.2" He makes it clear that logic-the first branch of philosophy
--"is subdivided into 'dialectic,' which deals with reasoning, and 'rhetoric,'
the art of speech." 2' 1 Dialectic includes the specification of the epistemology
of knowledge and the inductive methods by which the content of knowledge
of nature in physics is obtained as well as the rules of syllogistic deductive
reasoning. It is to be emphasized that reason is never conceived by any of
these Greek or Roman schools as a priori. It starts, instead, with data
given empirically through the senses. Of sensations, it is affirmed that they
are always true. Only propositions, because they are constituted of ideas
referring to "mind-pictures," are sometimes true, sometimes false.
What is most interesting of all is that the definition of sin (aluprta)
19. RACKHAM, INTRODUCTION TO CICERo's DE NATURA DEORum ii (The Loeb
Classical Library ed. 1933).
20. ARNOLD, op. cit. supra note 13, c. VI.
21. Id. at 129.
22. Id. at 131.
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appears at the very beginning of inductive logic before one arrives at de-
ductively formulated scientific theory with which the later stages of epis-
temology, scientific method and dialectic are concerned. Sin is defined as
assent to false propositions about inductively given data of natural science.a
Assent is wrong when it is based merely on "mind pictures" alone rather
than on "mind pictures" that are verified against inductively given knowl-
edge. In other words, sin is assent to false propositions concerning the
empirically verified factors of nature and the natural man or refusal to
assent to such empirically verified propositions. This puts in very precise
terms the thesis that the criterion of virtue and sin for culture and cultural
man is the empirically verified criterion of the true and false for nature and
natural man.
By nature and natural man is meant any and all facts concerning either
which is not in part at least an effect of the beliefs of men. By culture and
cultural man is meant any artifacts, i.e. facts which are in part at least what
they are because of behavior resulting from the beliefs of men. Natural
facts, not being man-made merely are; they are neither good nor bad any
more than they are true or false. Only artifacts, because by definition they
are man-made, deriving from beliefs of men which are true or false to nat-
ural facts, can be good or bad. Moreover, cultural facts are good or bad
solely because the propositions concerning natural facts from which they
derive are true or false.
This theory of ethical verification has the merit of providing a meaning
for sin in the methodology and science of nature. Certainly any moralist
wants to brand as sinful an untruthful report of facts by any natural scien-
tist. This definition of the Greek and Roman philosophers accomplishes
such a purpose.
Although a meaning for sin is provided by the Greek and Roman philos-
ophers in the preliminary inductive methods of natural science, these meth-
ods do not provide a sufficient criterion of virtue. One can sin by falsely
reporting a solitary inductively given fact. To have virtue, however, ac-
cording to the Greek and Roman criterion, one must be truthful not merely
about piecemeal facts in isolation, but also about all the intuitively given
facts in their relations to one another and to the whole. For this reason,
virtue requires the methods of deductively formulated scientific knowledge
of the latter stages of scientific inquiry as well as inductive methods of the
earlier stage.24 One can sin by the false reporting of data given by induc-
tive methods. One cannot, however, obtain virtue by purely inductive
methods. To obtain virtue, one must have systematic knowledge taking
all the inductively given facts concerning nature and human nature into
account in a single consistent theory. This is the meaning of the dictum
23. Id. at 132-33.
24. For a detailed account of the different stages of scientific inquiry and their respec-
tive scientific methods, see my LSH, supra note 1, cc. I-XII.
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of all the schools of Greek and Roman philosophy that "virtue is knowledge
in the light of the whole."25
Because dialectic includes epistemology as well as the specification of the
successive inductive and deductive scientific methods for knowing natural
facts, it is not the empirically verified deductively formulated scientific the-
ory in the form in which it comes from the scientist that alone provides the
criterion of the good. In addition the method by which the theory is veri-
fied must be analyzed to bring out the relation between the tecluical con-
cepts of the theory and directly inspectable data, thereby revealing its pre-
cise epistemological meaning. When this is done for any verified scientific
theory of nature, an entailed theory of man as mind or knower is given.
Thus any scientifically verified theory of nature turns out under methodo-
logical and epistemological analysis to be as much a verified theory of the
knower, his knowing, the meanings involved in his knowing, and, hence
of mind, as it is a verified theory of nature.
Nor should there be any surprise over this. For every successfully veri-
fied theory of nature is as much a verified instance of mental activity and
human knowing as it is an instance of a verified theory of nature. Failure
to note this is the major error of those who affirm that a philosophy of nat-
ural science and its ethics of natural law ignore human nature. But con-
versely, failure to realize that before scientically verified theories of natural
man and nature exhibit their implications for ethics, they must be analyzed
to bring out their epistemological meaning with respect to the nature of
man as a mind and knower, is the equally frequent error of many contem-
porary scientists and philosophical naturalists when they turn to ethics.
It is scientifically verified theory of natural man and nature (1) in the
light of all the facts about both, not merely about some facts, which is (2)
analyzed methodologically and epistemologically to bring out the type of
mind, meanings and modes of knowing required to arrive at its basic tech-
nical concepts, not merely the verified scientific theory unanalyzed, which
is the criterion of the good and the just for the artifacts which are culture
and cultural man. It is because all the facts, as far as it is humanly possible
to obtain them in a single theory at any stage of human history, not merely
some facts, are required that the Greeks specified virtue to be not conduct
in accord with knowledge of one particular fact about nature and human
nature, but knowledge in the light of the whole. It is because even system-
atically verified scientific theories which aim to include within themselves
all the facts must be analyzed methodologically and epistemologically to
bring out the nature of natural man as a mind and as a knower, that the
Greeks, with the later Socrates, added that the idea of the good is to be
found only by applying dialectic (i.e. methodological and epistemological
analysis) to the hypotheses of the verified natural sciences.
25. Italics mine. See ARNOLD, op. cit. supra note 13, at 140.
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A crucial question remains for consideration: If both traditional Oriental
and traditional Occidental philosophy have the same naturalistic method
for verifying personal and legal norms, why is it that the different tradi-
tional Oriental and Occidental philosophical systems produce different and
often conflicting personal and legal normative prescriptions? This ques-
tion has two answers, both of which are rooted in the epistemology of nat-
ural knowledge. We can merely state the answers here. Reasons for be-
lieving the answers to be correct will be found elsewhere.2"
One reason for the difference in ethical norms between Oriental and Oc-
cidental philosophy, notwithstanding the fact that both appeal to nature for
their verification, is that Oriental science and philosophy in their appeal to
nature tend, for the most part, to restrict knowledge of nature to entities
and relations which are known by immediate apprehension directly; West-
ern science and philosophy on the other hand introduce inferred theoreti-
cally designated entities and relations, the existence of which is verified
empirically only.indirectly by way of consequences deduced from the postu-
lated unobservable system of entities. When ethics is interpreted as the
philosopjiy of nature applied, it follows therefore, since nature, as immedi-
ately apprehended and described after the manner of Oriental philosophy,
is different from nature, as theoretically designated after the manner of
Western science and philosophy, that conduct and legal norms proceeding
from these different philosophical conceptions will be different also.
In Chapter XII of The Meeting of East and West reasons have been
given for holding that nature involves both of these factors and that the
Oriental philosophical conception of nature is quite compatible with the
Western philosophical conception. From this it follows, according to the
aforementioned theory of ethical verification, that an adequate ethics not
only can consistently, but must combine the ethical implications and appli-
cations of Oriental natural philosophy with those of Western philosophy.
The fact, therefore, that there are differences in ethical values between Occi-
dental and Oriental systems is an argument for rather than against this
naturalistic method of ethical verification.
Differences in the philosophy of nature may, however, have another
source. If, as is the case in Western science, nature as designated by its
verified theory cannot be deduced from immediately apprehended data but
must be determined by a trial and error postulation by the theoretical imag-
ination which is only indirectly verifiable by way of its deductive conse-
quences, then quite reasonable scientific and philosophical students of na-
ture, using empirical verification for their criterion of truth, may arrive,
especially at different periods of history, at different postulated theories of
natural man and nature. It will follow then, if ethics is but verified natu-
ralistic philosophical theory applied, that the different Western epistemo-
26. NORTHROP, MEW, supra note 1; Dorsey, supra note 4.
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logical philosophies of nature will have different ethical and legal norms, as
is the case with the natural philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hume,
Kant, Marx and Cassirer to mention but a few.
Even so, the contemporary scientific theories of Einstein and Schroedin-
ger have a greater capacity to take care of all the inductively given facts
than do the scientific theories of Locke, Newton, Aristotle or Plato. Con-
sequently, if we are to be true to the dictum of our classical method that
"'virtue is knowledge in the light of the whole," it is the verified scientific
theories of Einstein and Schroedinger rather than those knowvn to St.
Thomas, Locke, Hume and Kant to which we must apply dialectic.
It has become increasingly evident recently also that the epistemology
entailed by Einstein's and Schroedinger's verified theories is not that of
St. Thomas, Aristotle, Locke, Hume or Kant. Albert Einstein himself
has made this clear."7 Henry Margenau has more recently made it abun-
dantly evident in great detail..2 1 Even former positivists such as Herbert
Feigl2- now see that experimentally verified contemporary science entails
an epistemology different from that of Hume and the earlier positivists.
There are ample signs that philosophers of science approaching the con-
temporary problem of their subjects from many diverse philosophical stand-
points-investigators such as Einstein, Cassirer, Margenau, the writer and
Feigl, to mention but a few, are coming to agreement on the epistemology
of natiral science and natural man as knower which the verified theory
of contemporary natural science entails. It follows if we are to be true to
the classical dictum for ethical verification that virtue is not merely knowl-
edge in the light of the whole but also such knowledge subjected to the
epistemological analysis of dialectic, that it is this contemporary epistemo-
logical philosophy of twentieth century verified systematic theory in natural
science which must be our criterion of universally valid ethical and legal
norms for our world. The good society for the world then becomes con-
ceived as the one which permits this particular philosophy of nature and
natural man as knower to come to expression.
As previously noted, this contemporary empirically verified philosophy
of natural science provides a basic place for the directly verified factors in
man and nature that came to fulfillment best in the naturalistic philosophy,
ethics and law of the Orient, as well as for the theoretically designated, in-
directly verified component of natural man and nature which finds its high-
est manifestation in the deductively formulated experimentally verified sci-
ence, philosophy of science, ethics and law of the West. It follows that such
a norm for one world not only ought to be, if the traditional criterion of the
27. See Northrop, Einsten's Conception of Science, supra note 2.
28. MARGENAU, op. cit. supra note 2.
29. Feigl, Existential Hypotheses, 17 PHILOSOPHY OF Scm=Erc, No. 1 (Jan. 1950);
Logical Reconstruction, Realimn and Pure Scmiotic, 17 PHILosOPHY OF SCIENcE, No. 2
(April 1950).
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normative in both the Orient and the Occident is the correct one, but also
can be. It can be because in its content as well as in the method for deter-
mining ethical and legal norms upon which it rests, it gives expression to
the traditions each at least some twenty odd centuries old of the two major
civilizations of our world.
In his Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law3" Ehrlich tells us
that any new positive law to be effective must conform to the underlying
living law. It appears that the empirically verifiable universal, and hence
truly international, positive legal norm to which our inquiry has led us has
sufficient sources in Twentieth Century natural science to prepare mankind
to understand and deal with the realities of an atomic age, and at the same
time, because of its methodological roots in our world's oldest major tradi-
tions, meets Ehrlich's crucial test for effectiveness.
Implications for International Laze
The relevance of the foregoing analysis for international law can now be
specified. Ehrlich has made it clear that any positive legal institutions
which are to be effective must be grounded in the underlying cultural val-
ues of the living law. This means that an effective international law can-
not be based on the economic, political, legal and other cultural practices of
any one nation in the world, but must be rooted instead in the diverse ideol-
ogies and cultural traditions of its many nations and peoples. In an age
such as our own in which the political focus of the world has shifted from
Western Europe to Asia, this must include the Orient as well as the mod-
ern West. Hence, before a more effective international law can be ob-
tained an objective study must be made of the positive legal codes and
procedures and their respective underlying cultural and naturalistic philo-
sophical foundations of the world's major nations and cultures.
In studying the positive legal practices and underlying cultural beliefs
and habits of the Oriental peoples, one must direct attention to their char-
acter in ancient and medieval times before the influence of the West upon
them. This is necessary because the Oriental peoples have revolted against
a way of life based upon Western norms and institutions alone. All the
peoples of Asia are insisting that any international policy, and hence any
international law which has their support, must take'the institutions, values
and beliefs of the traditional Orient as well as those of the West into ac-
count. This makes it imperative in rooting contemporary international law
in the living law of the peoples of Asia that one go behind Westernized Asia
to the earlier Asian Asia.
When this is done, one finds that the different major peoples of Asia
have positive legal codes and procedures and underlying naturalistically
30. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Walter L.
Moll's transl. 1936).
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verified norms and practices of the living law in common.!" The same is
true in lesser part, notwithstanding the contemporary ideological and be-
havioral conflict between the Soviet Communists and the traditional mod-
em democracies, for the major peoples and nations of the West. 2 The im-
plications of these two facts for international lav have been indicated by
Gray L. Dorsey.3 3 It has been shown in addition that the common content
of the living law of the major Oriental peoples and the common content of
the traditional living law of the major Western peoples are both ultimate
and compatible.34 This means that in content as well as in method, the
two major traditional civilizations of our world already contain founda-
tions in the world's living law for a more effective positive international
law. We have but to take advantage of them.
What modifications in contemporary international law are required to
take advantage thus of the existant dc facto living law of the two major
civilizations of our world? First the traditional international law which
derives almost entirely from the philosophical beliefs and living law tradi-
tions of the later Medieval or early modern West must be superseded. Sec-
ond the current attempt to create a new international law based either on
the 19th Century Marxist ideology of the Russian Communists or on the
17th, 18th, 19th and 20th Century ideology of the French and British So-
cialists and the American Conservatives or New Dealers must also be
transcended. The traditional procedure has already turned international
relations into a "Cold War" for the minds of men and for the political direc-
tion of the nations which threatens the peace of the world. It also presents
Oriental and Latin American peoples with the unsatisfactory alternative of
accepting an international law and an international policy which fails to
take their different cultural values and the content of their living law into
account. This is the point of 0Premier Nehru's recent statement in this
country to the effect that as long as his government represents the policy
of his people, India will not take sides in the contemporary Western con-
flict between Marxist and non-Marxist Western doctrines, but will commit
itself only to an international policy which takes the positive and living legal
and cultural values of traditional India as well as those of the modern West
into account.
The moral for effective contemporary international law is clear. It must
face realistically the fact of cultural and ideological pluralism in the world
and bring itself into accord with this fact. There are many living laws--
Oriental as well as Occidental; there is not one living law.
Put more concretely, this means that before international law can become
effective new principles must be formulated for it according to which
31. NORmrROP, MfENV, supra note 1, cc. IX-XI.
32. Id., c. VIII.
33. Dorsey, supra note 4.
34. NoRTHRoP, MEV, supra note 1, c. XII.
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no nation or people gains moral and legal status under international law
unless they not merely insist upon the right to build their own cultural and
legal institutions in the light of their own particular values and traditions,
but also grafit and respect in practice as well as in word the right of other
nations and peoples to do likewise.
It might be thought that such a new international law would leave things
as they are with no novel practical consequences. This, however, is not the
case. Were this principle in effect, the present Russian Soviet government,
for example, would not be able to gain status in any international legal body
such as the United Nations unless it rejects its present explicitly written
and practiced theory of international law. In an exceedingly important ar-
ticle on the Soviet doctrine of international law, Mintauts Chakste has dem-
onstrated that according to this Soviet doctrine no nation has either moral
or legal status under international law unless it builds its political and legal
institutions upon Marxist Communist principles as interpreted by Lenin
and Stalin.35 To accept the new basis for international law which our prin-
ciple of pluralism in the world's living law prescribes, therefore, would
have the very practical effect of putting an end to the contemporary farce in
the United Nations in which the Soviet Russians have the privilege of
belonging to a legally constituted international institution because they sup-
posedly respect the rights of other peoples and nations to build their institu-
tions in their own way, when in fact the Soviet Russians are required by
their explicit doctrine of international law (to which unfortunately their
speeches and behavior conform) to regard all peoples who order their lives
on non-Marxist principles as behaving in an immoral and illegal manner.
This new basis for international law and its acceptance by the United
States, for example, would also go far to put an end to the present weakness
of national foreign policy in the contemporary world. This weakness arises
from the fact that our policy has all too often presented itself to other
peoples in Asia and Latin America and even continental Europe as a pro-
gram requiring them to conform to our legal norms, values and ideological
traditions rather than to actualize their own. That the people of the United
States when they reflect recognize the right of other people to build their
law and their economic and other cultural institutions in their own way is
not to be denied. This is of the essence of the doctrine of freedom of belief,
discussion and religion which is fundamental to all our political institutions.
To shift American foreign policy from a conception of international law
emphasizing primarily American or even Western democratic values and
traditions to one rooted in all the diverse values and traditions of all the
nations and cultures of the world would foster, therefore, rather than ham-
per the basic values of our American tradition.
35. Chakste, Soviet Concepts of the State, International Law and Sovcreignly, 43 Am.
J. INT'L L. 21 (1942).
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To make this tradition in foreign affairs effective, however, more than
lip service must be given to the definition of a foreign policy and the con-
struction of an international law which takes the legal practices and cul-
tural traditions of all the nations and cultures of the world and not merely
those of the United States or of Western civilization into account. The
emphasis must be shifted from a study merely of the legal institutions and
underlying cultural traditions of the United States or of British Common
law to those also of the rest of the world. The focus of study in interna-
tional law must be shifted from the national to the international standpoint.
Students of international law must be as seriously concerned with the legal
codes and underlying cultural practices and philosophical beliefs from
which the codes derive, of ancient and medieval India, of Confucian, Taoist
and Buddhist China, of Polynesian Asia and of Aztec and Inca as well as
Spanish or Portuguese Latin America as they are with those of British and
American common law and the Western legal and cultural traditions.
Nor can this investigation of the available grounds in the world's living
laws for a more effective international law, to which our analysis has led
us, stop with a mere determination of the positive legal codes and practices
and their underlying living law content and beliefs of the major cultures
and peoples of the world. One must also go behind the content and beliefs
to the facts in nature which led initially to their verification and subsequent
acceptance. This follows from our methodological principle that the
method for verifying ethical and legal norms in the traditional Orient and
the classical West is appeal to the facts of nature. It is at this point in the
available living law grounds for a more effective international law that in-
ternational sociological jurisprudence and the philosophy of the world's cul-
tures passes over into naturalistic jurisprudence and the philosophy of the
verified scientific theories of nature.
Without this passage from the basic living beliefs of a given culture,
which as contemporary social science has demonstrated are always philo-
sophical in character,3" and its attendant positive legal institutions to the
facts of nature against which the basic philosophical beliefs were initially
verified and are today verifiable, there would not be a way even in princi-
ple in international law of resolving international disputes arising out of a
conflict of national and cultural norms. As the earlier sections of this paper
have demonstrated, although the diverse peoples and cultures of the world
differ in their living and positive legal norms, they all agree in their oldest
and hence most established living law traditions, that the method for vali-
dating ethical and legal norms is by testing the basic philosophical concep-
tions of natural man and nature which they express against the facts of
nature.
36. See SOROKIN, SOCIETY, CULTURE AND PERSONALITY (1947); luckhhohn, The
Philosophy of the Navaho Indians in IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER
(Northrop ed. 1949); SHERiF, AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL PsYCHOLOGY (1948).
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The basis for this is obvious. Although people live in different cultures
with their differing and often conflicting living and positive norms, they
nonetheless reside on the same planet in the same nature. This traditional
common reference of the differing legal norms to nature provides, there-
fore, an effective criterion independent of these norms for judging between
them and even reconciling them in cases of conflict. The naturalistic em-
phasis of our earlier analysis enables us, therefore, to see how under a new
international law grounded in the fact of pluralism in the world's living
laws, international disputes centering in a conflict of living legal norms,
between different cultures and nations can in principle at least be resolved.
Merely to shift the principles of international law from the battle between
one or two major physically and economically powerful nations working
for an international policy and law based on its particular legal norms and
ideology to an international law grounded in ideological and living law
pluralism would go far toward easing the present tension in the world.
When to this is added the additional naturalistic method for settling inter-
national disputes arising out of the conflict of cultural or nationalistic living
law norms, the constructive way to a more effective settling of international
disputes by legal means is at least indicated.
Up to this point we have been considering the more specific implications
of our earlier analysis for a more effective international law from the stand-
point merely of grounding it in an understanding of the traditional living
law and its underlying empirically verified philosophy of nature of the many
traditional cultures of the world. It is an equally evident fact within the
living law of our world that we live in an atomic age. It is equally well
known that this fact is a consequence of the empirically verified theories of
20th century mathematical physics. It follows that a positive international
law which is to bring itself in accord with the living law of our time must
draw upon the philosophy of this mathematical physics as well as upon the
natural philosophy of the classical Greeks and Romans and the traditional
Oriental sages. In short, the empirically verified philosophy of nature to
which it turns for its content must be contemporary as well as traditional.
By combining the normative implications of the epistemologically ana-
lyzed philosophy of contemporary mathematical physics with the traditional
ethical and legal norms of the empirically verified philosophies of nature
of the traditional Orient and the classical West,"7 we should gain the tech-
nical scientific concepts necessary to meet intelligently the economic and
political needs of men the world over in an atomic age and at the same
time draw to the maximum degree upon those factors in the diverse living
laws of the two major civilizations of the world which have defined the
traditional norms and values of mankind. An international law with such
roots has a chance of capturing the hearts and minds of people the world
37. How this can be done consistently has been shown in principle in my MEW,
supra note 1, cc. XlI, XIII.
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over since it is sensitive to and grounds itself in their respective indigenous
norms and values. Any people or nation could put itself under such an
international law with the confidence that in the practical adjudication of
any dispute their own ways of life and values would be respected.
Such a new international law would be the most capable also of deliver-
ing on the frequent promises made to improve the economic conditions of
men everywhere. Being sensitive to contemporary scientific knowledge
and instruments, it would encourage a society which can surpass all others
in efficiency. Finally, such a new international law should be effective in
its moral controls over the otherwise ethically neutral scientific instruments.
Being philosophically minded as well as empirically verified and scientifi-
cally grounded, it directs attention to and draws for its sanctions upon the
moral, legal and religious norms, both traditional and contemporary, of
men everywhere.
One caution should be noted in applying these principles for the guidance
of international law to the contemporary foreign policy of any individual
nation. The foregoing analysis was concerned with the question as to
whether a more effective international law is possible and if so what the
basis for it must be. It must not be assumed in judging the contemporary
foreign policy of any particular nation that it should act as if the fore-
going principles for international law and international relations were ac-
cepted today by all the nations of the world. Unfortunately this is not the
case. As has been noted above, contemporary Soviet Russia believes in
and operates upon the basis of an international policy which regards any
other nation as immoral and evil and having no status under international
law unless it builds its institutions on Marxist Communist principles as in-
terpreted and applied by Moscow. Such belief and behavior are incompati-
ble with the grounds for a more effective international law which we have
indicated. It would be the utmost folly, therefore, from both a realistic
and idealistic standpoint for any nation which made the aforementioned
principles the touchstone of its own policy to act as if the other nations of
the world are also acting on the same principles.
What then is any nation which sets the principles for international law
and international conduct which we have specified as its standard and the
world's standard for international conduct, to do in the face of the fact that
one of the major powers in the world behaves and operates upon an incom-
patible basis and hence persistently with the intent of sabotaging such prin-
ciples? Two procedures are obviously required in such a situation. First,
one must root one's own policy and the justification for anything one does
internationally upon the world-grounded rather than the nation-grounded
principles which our analysis has indicated. Any nation which did this
would immediately remove itself from effective attack by Communist prop-
aganda which announces that this nation's policy is provincially nationalis-
tic only and imperialistic. Second, any individual nation's foreign policy
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must at the same time face with complete realism the ideological doctrine
and the behavior in accord with this doctrine of the Soviet Russians and
act in the light of such an understanding.
There is no higher compliment that one can pay to any other nation, nor
is there any more idealistic conduct with respect to any nation that one can
pursue than to judge it from its own ideological standards. When one
does this with respect to the Soviet Russians one notes immediately that it
is an essential part of their ideology and hence of their culture and legal
principles that ideas and ideals are not merely neutral but positively evil
unless they are embodied in matter. This means that the Soviet Russians
will have no real respect whatever for any nation or group of people such
as the Wallaceite liberals and Quaker pacifists who act toward them as if
they, the Russians, were nonmaterialistic idealists and pacifists who will
respect ideas and principles of policy disembodied from all matter and mil-
itary force.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that any culture, people, person or
nation judges others from the standpoint of its own philosophy and stand-
ards. In terms of the Russians this means that they will have no respect
for any nation or people which does not embody its own standards and prin-
ciples of policy in all the matter and force it can muster. It is not an acci-
dent that Russian policy, as Secretary of State Acheson has emphasized out
of real experience with the matter, respects only a de facto state of force at
a given place in the world which has to be reckoned with because it cannot
be budged. This is a necessary consequence of the Marxist philosophy of
dialectic materialism and the criteria of good conduct, moral and legal,
which it prescribes. Practically this means that a national policy with re-
spect to the contemporary Russians which is informed with respect to
their ideas and ideals must confront their ideology with the aforementioned
world ideology backed by force.
In short, a sound foreign policy must ground itself in the principles of a
truly world ideology outlined in this paper while at the same time con-
fronting Soviet ideology and policy with the force necessary to restrict it
to those people who want to be Communists. Only in this way, the Com-
munist doctrine and deeds being what they are, will other people have the
chance to reach their moral, social and legal norms in their own way. Only
thereby also will the universal moral and legal norms which this paper has
indicated to be valid have a chance to come to expression in the world.
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